found that English emotion words fall into 25 categories of synonyms. To find emotion nomenclature universals, the authors used P. Shaver et al. 's taxonomy in a sample of the world's languages and found that emotion categories were added in most languages in a relatively similar generalized sequence. Labeled first were the categories of anger and guilt; followed in Stage 2 by adoration, alarm, amusement, and depression; in Stage 3 by alienation, arousal, and agony; and ending with eagerness in Stage 4. The remaining 5 stages were derivatives of Stages 1-4. Thus, in the folk taxonomy, Stages 1-4 are basic linguistic emotion categories. Motives for labeling emotions were driven possibly by the need to maintain social control, the identification of prototypical emotions elicited in interpersonal relationships, and the need for terms to identify intrapersonal emotions. Features of markedness theory were corroborated for English emotion terms.
with the list created by Murdock (1945) , which later was expanded by Tiger and Fox (1971) , Hockett (1973) , and D. E. Brown (1991) . The search for cross-cultural similarities flourished in anthropology, linguistics, and psychology.
Universals have been demonstrated in natural language in semantics (Herrmann & Raybeck, 1981; Ullman, 1963) ; connotative or affective meaning (Osgood, 1964; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975) ; phonology, grammar, lexicon, and kinship terminology (Greenberg, 1966) ; sibling terminology (Kronenfeld, 1974; Nerlove <%,Romney, 1967) ; cooking terms (Lehrer, 1974) ; biology (Bricker, 1976) ; botanical life-forms (C. H. Brown, 1977) ; bodyparts terminology (Andersen, 1978) ; and zoological life-forms (C. H. Brown, 1979) and possibly also in such topics as the facial display of some emotions (Ekman, 1972; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969) , the appraisal process in elicitation of emotions (Scherer, 1997) , the personality lexicon (Goldberg, 1981) , the conceptual organization of emotion terms (Russell, 1983) , the use of antonyms (Raybeck & Herrmann, 1990 , and subjective well-being (Diener & Diener, 1996) . On the basis of a review of 15 years of cross-cultural research and ethnographic reports, Mesquita and Frijda (1992) suggested additional likely universal aspects of emotions.
Objections to Universals in the Emotion Lexicon
Perhaps the demonstration of universals best known to psychology is the study of folk color terms by Berlin and Kay (1969) . They found that the order in which color terms were encoded was similar across languages. If a language had only two color terms, the terms were always for black and white. Languages with three color terms always had added red, and so on (see Witkowski & Brown, 1977 , for a revision of the encoding sequence). Munroe and Munroe (1991) wrote that Berlin and Kay's study "has probably inspired more research than any other single contribution to cultural anthropology in the past two decades" (p. 28).
Despite such praise for the study of color terms, the search for universals in the folk emotion lexicon has its opponents. They contend that human beings can effectively communicate their emotions without resorting to words of emotion (e.g., Beeman, 1985) . We agree, because we have observed the frequent use of exclamations, descriptive terms, or sentences in our research. For example, instead of emotion words, Zuni use different exclamations to express disgust, disappointment, pleasure, shame, and surprise (S. Newman, 1958) . In Arawak, lacking a word for disgust, unpleasant odors are described as smelling bad, evil, or malodorous (Bennett, 1989) . Having no word for enthusiasm, the Luganda language uses sentences such as "The person is working hard" or "The person shows strong interest in the task." Metaphors also are used. In place of the word enthrallment, Luganda uses the metaphor "The person left us with our mouth open." Vocal cues, in place of words of emotion, are effective communicators of emotions (Pittman & Scherer, 1993 ). Yet, the questions still remain: When emotions were lexically coded, was the developmental sequence of naming the emotions similar across cultures, and what was the impetus for encoding emotions?
Objections to the search for cross-cultural similarities in the emotion lexicon also are motivated by the belief that the finding of growth in emotion lexicons may revive the discredited concept of evolution: the notion of languages falling along a scale of linguistic maturity ranging from so-called primitive languages to purported advanced or complex languages (cf. Leff, 1973 Leff, , 1981 . We agree with R. Brown (1958) and Beeman (1985) that languages are neither advanced nor primitive. They fulfill the communication needs of their speakers.
There is ample evidence to support this claim. For example, because of particular needs, and in contrast to English, the Karok (Bright, 1957) and Yurok (Robins, 1958) languages of the California Indians have approximately 20 words related to different conditions of acorns, such as acorn dough, acorn water, acorn flour, moldy acorns, and leached acorns. The Cree language has about 30 verbs to refer to different causes of anger, such as anger resulting from insults (e.g., kisemikoo: "He is insulted; he is angered by his speech"), walking (e.g., kisewuska'tao: "He is angry from walking"), mutual ill feeling, taking leave of an individual on a walk, and offensive visual sights (Watkins, 1938, pp. 284-285) . Similarly, to make somebody angry, to become angry, to be angry at somebody, and to be angry faced are all encoded in separate words of emotion in the Shuswap language (Kuipers, 1974) .
We make no claim that English is inferior to these Indian languages nor that these Indian languages are inferior to English. Instead, on the assumption that the naming of emotions was gradual rather than sudden, the goal of this study was to determine whether the need to communicate about emotion-eliciting events was sufficiently alike so that the encoding sequence progressed similarly across languages. Whorf (1956) asserted that language shapes thoughts and perception. Whatever is not classified or labeled, claimed Whorf, the speakers of the language fail to see or attend to. There is no empirical support for the extreme version of his hypothesis (E. Hunt & Agnoli, 1991; cf. Gumperz & Levinson, 1996) . Nevertheless, the specter of the hypothesis is present when objection to the search for universals is expressed on the grounds that speakers of languages with small emotion lexicons can differentiate emotions as well as speakers using large emotion lexicons (cf. Beeman, 1985) . Although this assertion has not been verified empirically, given the many alternative ways of expressing emotions, it no doubt can be shown to be valid. Be that as it may, the purported skills of speakers of small lexicons in differentiating emotions do not provide compelling justification to preclude the search for creditable human universals in emotion lexicons.
Use of Dictionaries
Because we did not have access to native speakers of the languages that were used in this study, we relied on dictionaries. The use of dictionaries is questioned by some scholars because of the claim that emotion words in different languages are seldom equivalent (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990; Lutz, 1988; Lutz & White, 1986; Russell, 1991; Shweder, 1994; White, 1993; Wierzbicka, 1995) . The assertion is made that emotion words are not simply referential labels for putative, universal, internal feeling states but, more importantly, are about social relations, particularly power relations (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990; Lutz, 1988) , involving meaning-making practices of individuals engaged in ordinary conversation and interaction (White, 1993) . In that vein, emotion terms may be no more than names for complex narratives, proposed Shweder, that some societies use to interpret somatic and affective experiences, whereas other societies rely on different linguistic resources to represent their feelings. For example, instead of the Western tradition of interpreting particular experiences as an indication of sadness, with the latter term being the name for a complex story according to Shweder, the Tahitians use general terms, such as feeling ill, troubled, or fatigued (Levy, 1984) .
According to the foregoing perspectives, emotion terms (e.g., anger, fear, and disgust) are language-specific and culture-specific; therefore, they cannot identify human universals (Wierzbicka, 1995) . This claim is a particular instance of a general philosophical movement currently popular in anthropology (Polier & Roseberry, 1989) and sociology (Sanders, 1995) called "postmodernism," which has as its tenet the belief that cross-cultural comparisons and the search for universals are "neither desirable, nor ... possible" (Raybeck & Herrmann, 1996, pp. 156-157) .
Setting aside the philosophical position of postmodernism, partly because much of postmodern ethnography is of limited value (Polier & Roseberry, 1989; Sanders, 1995) and partly because it is no freer of Western ethnographic semantics than traditional modes of doing ethnography (Rosenberg, 1990) , the objections to the search for universals and to the assumption of translation equivalence of emotion words across languages generally are based on ethnographic publications reporting the impressions of the author. At best, such impressions may serve as the basis for future studies. They should not be cited as evidence that there are no universal categories of emotions and that the use of dictionaries falsely assumes translation equivalence. Ultimately, given the bias to find differences rather than human universals, ethnographers can find them no matter what the topic of comparison is, even when the similarities may be more striking and numerous.
Despite the absence of published studies to show that the lexical meaning of emotion words does indeed vary dramatically across languages, the influence of impressionistic ethnographic reports is so substantial that Russell (1991) , in a major review of the emotion literature, was driven to warn that "the cautious researcher will no longer assumes [sic] that emotion words in different languages can be translated one-to-one" (p. 433). In the immediate context in which Russell made this comment, he was reviewing cross-cultural studies using free associations and semantic differential ratings (e.g., Tanaka-Matsumi & Marsella, 1976) . Not surprisingly, the connotative or affective and associative meaning of words differed across cultures. Similarities and differences in associative meaning also were found by Hupka, Otto, Tarabrina, and Reidl (1993) .
But, as Russell (1991) noted, it is not known to what extent free associations and semantic differential ratings are appropriate measures of lexical meaning. For example, one could reasonably contend that lexical meaning is governed by conventional use of emotion words, whereas free associations and semantic differential ratings tend to tap personal values and individual experiences with, and reactions to, emotion words. More to the point of the influence of ethnographic reports, Russell (1991) , in the absence of empirical studies, relied on them when he questioned the assumption of translation equivalence for emotion words: "Reports cited here earlier sometimes pointed out that what was once taken as a translation equivalent turned out, on closer inspection, not to be so" (p. 433). Nevertheless, in agreement with our position, Russell also cautioned that "the claims from the ethnographic method can be accepted only tentatively, until verified by other methods" (p. 435).
Since Russell's (1991) review, there have been two studies conducted on the issue of cultural universals in the semantic structure of emotion terms, both of them finding support for the cross-cultural comparability of emotion concepts (Church, Katigbak, Reyes, & Jensen, 1998; Romney, Moore, & Rusch, 1997) , with one study even numerically expressing the comparability. Contrary to the ethnographic reports, Romney et al. found only a minor portion of the semantic structure to be culture-specific relative to the much larger, universally shared aspect of the semantic structure. Using judged-similarity tasks of 15 English and Japanese emotion terms by Americans and Japanese, Romney et al. found that a remarkable 66% of the semantic structure of the emotion terms was shared by Americans and Japanese. Only 6% was culture-specific. Although the latter percentage clearly supports those who selectively focus on cross-cultural differences, its significance pales in comparison with the size of the variance due to measurement error (i.e., 19%) and the variance unique to the individual (i.e., 9%), a combined effect almost five times larger than the cultural effect. These findings support the assumption of emotion words in one language roughly approximating in semantic meaning those in other languages-an expectation that is the bedrock of the construction of bilingual dictionaries. Apparently, dictionary definitions suffice, because millions of people learn foreign languages and successfully communicate with each other. As Mesquita and Frijda (1992) noted, "The fact that the meanings of emotion words in foreign languages can be explained, even when the words have no equivalents in some other language, attests to the correspondence of structural elements" (p. 201).
Motivation to Encode Emotions
If the instigation for naming emotion categories was a hodgepodge of motives, then the encoding sequence across languages would be expected to be random. Given, however, that the naming of color terms (Berlin & Kay, 1969) or folk botanical life-forms (C. H. Brown, 1977) was uniform across cultures, we hypothesized that the sequence in which folk emotion categories were added to natural language likewise proceeded in a regular manner. What may have driven the encoding process?
Facial Expressions of Emotions
Facial expressions apparently are the dominant means for recognition of emotions, having a success rate in the range of 62%-95% depending on the emotion and the culture (Russell, 1994) . In comparison, recognition of emotions from vocal cues has a success rate of only about 50%. Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1965 proposed that human facial expressions of emotions facilitate communication and indeed "serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant" (p. 364). Total absence of facial expressions of emotions would appear to sorely strain interpersonal relationships. Thus, one plausible reason for encoding emotion concepts may have been to identify common facial expressions of emotions. If this was the motivation for establishing an emotion lexicon, then one would expect all languages, in their initial stages of development, to have terms for the facial expressions of emotions that are identifiable cross-culturally, such as anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1971) . Because the status of contempt (Ekman & Friesen, 1986 ) and Izard's additional facial expressions of interest and shame as universal emotions are controversial (Ekman, 1992) , they are not included in the facial expression group of emotions.
The prediction that facial expressions of emotions may have been the spur for the initial encoding of emotions can be worded differently by altering the emphasis. Some scholars, following Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1965 , adopted the view that affective facial expressions have biological roots (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980) . Lutz and White (1986) wrote that those who propose that emotions are innate expect this innateness to be reflected cross-culturally in linguistic codes. The world's emotion lexicons, from this perspective, are expected to "be shaped in systematic ways by the biological constraints of universal core affects" (Lutz & White, 1986, p. 416) . Whether the face serves as a source of affective communication or as a source of innate emotions, the prediction is that all languages have terms for facial emotions.
Social Control
If the basis for labeling emotions was to facilitate manipulation or coercion of individuals, perhaps to minimize antisocial behavior, then one would expect the emotion lexicons of all languages, primarily in their initial growth periods, to have encoded a profile of emotions such as anger, outrage, envy-jealousy, guilt-shame, and humiliation. The rationale for this hypothesis is that such emotions strongly affect individuals and cause them to change their behavior, especially when generated or expressed by someone with power over the target individuals (e.g., employer, parent, tribal chief). Although not each of the aforementioned emotions has been discussed by scholars with regard to its effectiveness in achieving social conformity, such scholarship is available for anger (Averill, 1982) , envy (Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969) , guiltshame (Ausubel, 1955) , and jealousy (Hupka, 1981) .
Ego-Focused Emotions
The distinguishing feature of the social control emotions is that they imply dissatisfaction with someone-a desire to bring about change. For example, jealousy implies that someone is seeking to take away one's partner, anger implies conflict with someone, guilt implies violation of a norm, and envy implies resentment of an advantage enjoyed by others.
But there are emotions that do not imply a need to change one's behavior or an attempt to influence others. They are, to borrow a concept from Markus and Kitayama (1991) , "ego-focused emotions." Such emotions "have the individual's internal attributes (his or her own needs, goals, desires, or abilities) as the primary referent" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 235) . That is, whereas facial and social control emotions, in general, are more likely triggered by events external to the individual, ego-focused emotions frequently occur without any perceptible external trigger. They include concepts such as anguish, defeat, dejection, desire, hope, longing, loneliness, lust, rejection, relief, suffering, and zest. Languages with such emotion terms in the initial stages of development of the emotion lexicon would suggest that the speakers were less interested in social control than in the emotional climate within the individual.
Prototype Model
Scholars using the prototype approach suggest that categories of emotions "are formed as a result of repeated experience and become organized around prototypes" (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987 , p. 1061 . Prototypes are generic mental representations of the important features of a similar set of emotions. Thus, anger may be the generic representation of related emotions such as irritation, hate, and disgust. Interrelated sets of emotion categories become organized within an abstract-to-concrete hierarchy. Thus, at the most abstract level, the only meaningful distinction found by Shaver et al. was one between positive and negative emotions. Subordinate to this superordinate category, they found so-called cognitively basic-level terms: anger, fear, joy, love, sadness, and surprise. If basic-level prototypes were the driving force in the establishment of emotion lexicons, then the aforementioned concepts of emotions should be present in the initial formation of all lexicons.
Overview of This Study
Our goals were to establish whether the naming of folk emotion categories evolved in a similar sequence across languages and to determine what may have been the motivation for the naming of the initial stages. We used foreign language dictionaries to ascertain whether an English emotion term had an equivalent term in each of the foreign languages. Such information made it possible for us to rank order emotion categories from those that were present in all languages to those that were found infrequently. The underlying assumption of this study was that emotion terms that were present in all languages presumably had been encoded first, followed by those found in successively fewer languages.
English has hundreds of folk emotion words (Averill, 1975; Wallace & Carson, 1973) . The large number of emotion words raised the question of which words should be searched for in other languages. Shaver et al. (1987) used a hierarchical cluster analysis to demonstrate that English emotion terms can be classified into 25 distinct categories. Thus, synonyms of anger comprised one category, synonyms of depression comprised another category, and so on. This finding prompted the proposal that the range of emotion-arousing dilemmas worthy of attention to speakers of English was limited to the 25 emotion categories. Therefore, rather than seeking equivalents for every English emotion term in other languages, we sought to determine whether similar categories had been encoded. A foreign language was deemed to have encoded a particular category if only one of the many emotion terms comprising the corresponding category in English was present in the foreign language.
When analyzing the findings, we observed that the universal emotion encoding process may have proceeded in agreement with some of the principles that had been proposed to underlie regularities in the classifications of folk botanical life-forms and color terms (C. H. Brown & Witkowski, 1980) . In light of the possibility that the similarities in the lexical folk classification of natural phenomena may identify a human universal, we explore later in the Classification by binary opposition and Marked and unmarked emotion categories sections how the principle of binary opposition and aspects of markedness theory (Greenberg, 1966 (Greenberg, , 1975 (Greenberg, , 1987 may apply to the encoding of universal folk emotion terms.
Method

Languages
There are an estimated 6,000 separate spoken languages (Crystal, 1997) . Creating a representative sample is made difficult by the lack of agreement among scholars in the classification of languages. Any sample is a compromise between competing theories of what constitutes separate languages and separate groupings of people. We used the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) probability sample of 60 major geographical and linguistic groupings and Voegelin and Voegelin's (1977) classification of the world's languages.
Appendix A lists the HRAF geographical and linguistic groupings numbered 1-60, the representative languages we used, Voegelin and Voegelin's (1977) classification of the languages, and the sources of the dictionaries. The HRAF generally provided two languages for each geographical and linguistic grouping. The second language was selected only when no dictionary was accessible for the first language. Unavailability of dictionaries for both languages prompted the search for a substitute in Voegelin and Voegelin's classification in the same language grouping. For example, in the first listing in Appendix A, Kirundi was substituted for the Pygmy and Khoisan languages. The HRAF provided no recommendation for Furian, Koraan, and Kordofanian speakers (No. 13 in Appendix A). Therefore, we selected Uduk, a Koman language. The unavailability of dictionaries for Trobriands and Manus (No. 38 in Appendix A) led to the substitution of Neo-Melanesian, a hybrid language increasingly spoken in the region and incorporating pidginized terms (e.g., disappointment: "bel i-nogut," i.e., "belly no good"). Regarding Number 41 in Appendix A, the HRAF recommended either Copper Eskimo or South Alaska Eskimo. Our dictionary did not indicate which dialect it had recorded. Regarding the HRAF recommendation of Ecuadorial Highland Quechua (i.e., No. 52 in Appendix A), we had access to a dictionary of Peruvian Quechua.
The ideal condition for determining the cross-cultural development of the emotion lexicon would be met if the world's emotion lexicons varied widely in size. Less than ideal, 26 languages (i.e., 43%) in our HRAF sample were principal languages of the world. That is, they were spoken by at least one million people {World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1992) , a circumstance usually correlated with large, perpetually expanding lexicons. To boost the probability of obtaining small emotion lexicons, we selected four additional languages (i.e., Dehu, Mazahua, Toaripi, and Walpiri) with fewer than one million speakers from somewhat disparate regions of the world (i.e., Polynesia, Mexico, Gulf of Papua, and Australia, respectively). These languages are added to Appendix A.
Dictionaries
To determine the growth of emotion lexicons across languages, one should ideally use the earliest available dictionary for each language. Yet, such dictionaries are frequently much smaller than modem dictionaries. Are the earlier dictionaries smaller because the lexicographers failed to record words or because the languages had not yet grown to their present sizes'? The completeness of the earliest dictionaries is subject to doubt because of the possibility that the earlier lexicographers may not have been as sophisticated in eliciting words from native speakers as are modern lexicographers. We used modern dictionaries to minimize the criticism that the absence of emotion words in languages is due to errors of omission by the lexicographers. However, that decision made it difficult to find languages lacking abstract words for emotions, perhaps due to the increasing homogenization of the world's cultures nurtured by the widespread international commerce of the 20th century and the dissemination of cultural products such as art, literature, and movies. A related issue, because languages are continually growing, is that dictionaries that are published at a later date than those used in this study may contain emotion words that had not yet been formulated at the time of the earlier dictionaries that we used.
Only non-English dictionaries were available for 15 languages. Bororo and Yakut required Portuguese and Russian dictionaries, respectively. French dictionaries were used for Azande, Kirundi, Kurd, and Touareg. Spanish dictionaries were used for Aymara, Campa, Cuna, Guarani, Mazahua, Pemon, Tzeltal, Warao, and two words (i.e., love andpity) for Mataco. Shaver et al. (1987) compiled a list of several hundred English emotion terms. American undergraduates rated the nouns on a 4-point scale according to how certain they were that each one named an emotion. Using a stringent criterion for establishing a word's emotion-naming proficiency, Shaver et al. retained 135 nouns with mean prototypicality ratings of 2.78 or higher. These nouns were then rated by a new group of students according to their similarity to each other. A hierarchical cluster analysis distributed the 135 concepts into 25 clusters of similar emotion words. Appendix B lists Shaver et al.'s findings. Presumably, these 25 discrete emotion-arousing experiences were of such significance to the Englishspeaking people of the past that they were encoded. We added the word fascination to the enthrallment category because it is a synonym for the category and it appeared more frequently in dictionaries of foreign languages than Shaver et al.'s terms of enthrallment and rapture. Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992) found relatively similar cluster categories in Italy and China, thereby providing evidence that their original finding was robust and generalizable to non-English languages. Schimmack and Reisenzein (1997) recently found evidence that socalled judgments of similarity in meaning of emotion terms may not be due to comparisons of semantic properties. Instead, they may reflect impressions of the degree to which emotions co-occur in everyday life. Because it is not currently known whether different groupings, either in number or content, would be obtained if Shaver et al.'s (1987) emotion terms were judged on the basis of co-occurrence rather than their semantic properties, we continued to use the 25 emotion categories of Shaver et al.
Emotion Categories
Given Shaver et al.'s (1987) finding, the majority of English emotion words apparently are synonyms or refer to variations in intensity of particular emotions. Because it was not informative to determine whether similar synonyms and similar variations in intensity were encoded in other languages, and because lexicographers were born in different Englishspeaking nations and at different time periods, each with unique preferences for particular emotion words, we judged a language as having encoded one of Shaver et al.'s emotion cluster categories if merely one of the synonyms or intensity terms listed in Appendix B, regardless of its grammatical form, was present. Even metaphors such as the Tiwi expression "for someone's heart to jump" in reference to excitement (or fright; Lee, 1993) were deemed as having encoded one of Shaver et al.'s categories (i.e., enthusiasm). Only once, in Quechua. did we not record the language as having a term for a particular category, in this instance the envy category, because the term envidiakuy (i.e., to be jealous or envious) was borrowed, with a minor grammatical alteration, from the Spanish term envidia (i.e., envy). Also, exclamations of disgust, fear, surprise, and so on were not considered to be encoded emotion terms. There is no doubt that our reliance on dictionaries rather than native speakers may have led to the selection of words in the foreign languages that were not the best exemplars of the category, as judged by current usage. Our goal was to establish whether a particular general emotion category had been encoded, not to find the best exemplars of the category.
The mere presence of emotion terms in target languages did not signify that their application was necessarily identical to that in English. A difference we observed was that in some languages the terms identified behavior rather than phenomenological states. Consider the emotion word torment. It is not evident what the students had in mind in Shaver et al.'s (1987) study when they established it as an emotion category. Perhaps it is the affliction that people experience when they are told disagreeable things day after day. In some languages, torment refers to the act of causing someone to suffer (e.g., Cree), to give pain (e.g., Tonga), or to torture (e.g., Tzeltal), whereas in other languages (e.g., Quechua), it apparently refers to the phenomenological experience of calamity, misfortune, or grief. Similar differences in meaning across languages were evident with other emotion categories, such as relief. But the fact that the emotion categories were encoded, even if in reference to instrumental behavior in one language and to phenomenological experiences in another language, makes communication possible between speakers of the different languages, and the effort to establish common meaning may be no greater than the ease with which personality traits in English can be used as emotion terms.
Procedure
Alison P. Lenton and Keith A. Hutchison each sought the emotion terms in Appendix B for one half of the languages. That is, they searched for the translation of one term for each of Shaver et al.'s (1987) 
Results and Discussion
Appendix C catalogs the emotion words of the 60 HRAF languages, followed by the 4 non-HRAF languages, for Shaver et al.'s (1987) cluster categories and the emotion concepts of awe and interest. We included the latter two emotion terms in our search because Ekman (1994) viewed them as identifying separate emotions, although in Shaver et al.'s study neither term was rated highly as representing emotions. They are not discussed further here because without knowing Shaver et al.'s cluster category to which they belong, their place in the universal sequence of development of the emotion lexicon cannot be established.
The presence of English translations in Appendix C, such as the word love in the adoration column for the Aymara language means that no term was available for adoration in Aymara, prompting a search in the dictionary for translations of the alternatives in the adoration cluster category (see Appendix B). A blank space at the intersection of a target language and a cluster category indicates that no emotion term was found, even for the alternatives.
Words with a superscript a are composite words. That is, the identical word appeared in 2 or more of Shaver et al.'s (1987) cluster categories. For clarification, consider the Amhara word "sgqay" in the agony column. Whereas in English a distinction is made between agony and torment with the encoding of separate words, Amhara uses the identical word.
Appendix C identifies the composite words that were included in the data analysis. However, many more composite words were found. Appendix D lists all of the composite words. Most of them did not warrant inclusion in the data analysis because of the availability of alternative emotion concepts in the target language. For example, in the Ainu language, eyaitupa refers to being eager to do something and to having desire. Although this particular term is a composite word for Shaver et al.'s (1987) categories of eagerness and arousal (see Appendix B), Ainu was not classified in Appendix C as a composite for the two categories because of the availability of another word for desire (i.e., rusuike: being desirous of) whose meaning was limited to that category. Potential composite words also were avoided by obtaining translations for alternative concepts within a particular category. For example, in the arousal category, if the concept of desire elicited a composite in the target language, searches were made instead for translations of lust, passion, or infatuation (see Appendix B). Because the emotion words of awe and interest were not included in Shaver et al.'s cluster analysis, they were not part of any cluster category; therefore, any purported composite in Appendix D involving those words was not considered a composite word in the data analysis.
Composite Words
We viewed composite words as having a special status. From a lexical perspective, the definition of composite category terms (e.g., envy and jealousy were encoded in only one word in 20% of our sample of the world's languages: Amhara, Bemba, Cree, Ifugaw, Klamath, Lau, Luganda, Mossi, Papago, Tiwi, Toaripi, Tonga, and Zulu) is vague to speakers of languages that differentiate them into separate concepts, necessitating further effort to determine which of the several applications of the composite terms are in use in conversations.
From a developmental perspective, on the basis of the assumption that emotion terms may possibly expand from general statements (e.g., feeling upset) to more specific emotion terms (e.g., feeling annoyed, feeling anguished, or feeling insulted) in later stages of language development, composite category labels have greater potential of spawning, or differentiating into, additional emotion categories than settled emotion terms. The composite terms carry surplus meaning in that the scope of their application is broader.
In sum, composites may have an intermediate status between the presence and absence of emotion terms in a particular language. With regard to the data analysis, we recorded languages with composites as having emotion terms for all of the cluster categories included in the composites, even though such terms are not as differentiated as they are in the elaborated emotion lexicons. Shaver et al.'s (1987) cluster categories, they provided no information regarding the sequence in which emotion terms were encoded (i.e., Cree, Dutch, Guarani, Hausa, Hungarian, Iban, Khasi, Maltese, Sinhalese, Somali, Thai, Tibet, Tonga, Vietnamese, Yakut, Yoruba, and Zulu). This number increases to 22 when the 5 languages at the end of Table 1 are included (i.e., Amhara, Azande, Korean, Tamil, and Serbian). These 5 languages also had emotion concepts for the 25 cluster categories but are listed in Table 1 to show that they had composite words for some categories.
Growth Patterns of Emotion Lexicons
Column 1 in Table 1 identifies the 46 different types of encoding sequences found in this study. Each row represents the emotion lexicon of a particular language using Shaver et al.'s (1987) cluster category labels. Table 1 specifies for each language the presence (+), absence (-), or composite (C) of emotion categories.
Of the 33,554,432 logically possible sequences of encoding emotion terms for the 25 categories (i.e., 2 25 ), 46 sequences were found with the remaining 47 languages (Iroquois and Wolof had identical encoding sequences). For 2 languages to have identical encoding sequences for 25 categories was unlikely to be due to chance. Such a finding suggests that the pressures in each language to enlarge the emotion lexicon may be similar enough to steer the encoding process in the same general direction across cultures with diverse language structures, cultural ecologies, and social organizations. This contrasts sharply with Whorf's (1956) linguistic hypothesis that each language embodies and perpetuates a particular worldview.
Implicational Universals
Our transitive data, falling into a category of unidimensional scaling known as "Guttman scaling," were analyzed with correspondence analysis (Weller & Romney, 1990) . However, the low variability in the data rendered the output uninterpretable. Consequently, we used implicational universals for analyzing the data.
Scanning of the rows in Table 1 indicates that the 47 languages had emotion terms for at least 15 of the 25 cluster categories of Shaver et al. (1987) . Column 2 in Table 1 lists the frequency of labeled cluster categories for each language.
What determined the unalphabetical listing of Shaver et al.'s (1987) cluster categories in Table 1 ? The criterion governing the sequence of cluster category labels was to establish a transitive sequence, that is, to maximize the longest unbroken string of pluses in Table 1 across languages, such that the string grows in proportion to the increase in the frequency of encoded cluster category labels (listed in column 2 of Table 1 ). This procedure captures the generalized encoding sequence relative to all languages in our sample rather than the idiosyncratic sequence of any particular language. It renders the common denominator, so to speak, shared universally by languages in the labeling sequence of emotion categories.
First, we found that all languages had terms for the categories of anger and guilt. An obvious transitive or universal implicational relationship is that if a language had at least one folk term for the subsequent categories (e.g., adoration, alarm), it most likely also had at least one term for the categories of anger and guilt.
Second, all languages also had folk terms for the categories of adoration, alarm, amusement, and depression. But an important dissimilarity precludes viewing the 6 categories as forming one group. Namely, the latter 4 categories were composites in some languages. In Bororo, for example (see Appendix D), the identical word (i.e., pagiido) denoted fear and dread, terms found in Shaver et al.'s (1987) categories of alarm and anxiety, respectively. Similarly, Amhara and Toaripi joined the categories of alarm and dismay. Tamil combined depression with dismay, and Papago linked the categories of adoration and arousal. Because we viewed composites as having the potential to spawn new emotion category terms and because of that potential, they probably were more recently encoded than noncomposite terms; their unsettled state precluded their inclusion with single-category terms such as anger and guilt.
Third, languages with 17-18 cluster category labels expanded the folk emotion lexicon shared by our sample of languages by adding terms that were included in Shaver et al.'s (1987) categories of alienation, arousal, and agony (the latter category having composites in Amhara, Bororo, Mossi, and Truk). Fourth, it is apparent in Table 1 that languages with 19 category labels increased the number of terms that all sampled languages had encoded by a factor of one with the addition of the eagerness category.
Fifth, languages with 20 category labels enlarged the pool of folk emotion terms common to all languages with the additional cluster categories of anxiety, aggravation, and pride. An implicational universal or transitive relationship is that if a language has folk emotion terms for the category of, say, pride, it also has terms for the preceding categories listed in Table 1 .
Sixth, languages with folk emotion terms for 21 of Shaver et al.'s (1987) cluster categories increased the shared pool of labeled terms by the addition of words in the contentment category. Seventh, all languages with 22 cluster categories shared having encoded additional emotion terms for the categories of amazement, envy, and disgust. Eighth, the number of mutually labeled emotion categories increased in the sampled languages with 23 and 24 cluster categories by the addition of words in the pity, enthusiasm, and dismay categories. Lastly, the final expansion to the full roster of 25 cluster categories added the emotion terms for the categories of exasperation, relief, longing, torment, and enthrallment.
We accomplished the identification of the foregoing implicational universals or transitive relationships by determining which folk emotion categories were added universally across languages as the emotion lexicon expanded. For such relationships to have been established, emotion categories must have been added to languages in a relatively specific, rather than random, order. If the implicational universal relationships of this study are interpreted diachronically, then the cluster categories of anger and guilt were encoded first in all languages, followed by adoration, alarm, amusement, depression, and so on. Figure 1 summarizes the likely developmental sequence for adding emotion categories to folk vocabularies across languages using the implicational universals as the basis for the hypothesis. Because the proposed sequence of emotion nomenclature is based on the growth of emotion categories common to all languages in our sample, some languages may deviate slightly from our model. First, we identify some features of the encoding process, and then we address several likely interpretations for the particular encoding sequence shown in Figure 1 . Shaver et al.'s (1987) 25 cluster categories were found. Adore = adoration; Amuse = amazement; Enthuse = enthusiasm; Exasperate = exasperation; Long = longing; Enthrall = enthrallment; + = an emotion term is present in the language; a This language is not in the Human Relations Area Files. It is a language with fewer than one million speakers.
Features of Lexical Encoding of Folk Emotion Terms
Classification by binary opposition. Do principles of folk classification differ for each domain? That is, do different sets of principles govern folk classifications of colors, emotions, botanical terms, and so on? Or do similar principles operate in all domains? C. H. Brown and Witkowski (1980) proposed several principles that they believed to be language universals in folk classifications.
Among them were binary opposition and marking principles. Our findings suggest that they also may apply to the universal encoding sequence for folk emotion categories.
Witkowski and Brown (1977) suggested binary opposition as a general principle of naming behavior in the encoding of colors. C. H. Brown (1977) found binary opposition to operate similarly across languages in the lexical encoding of botanical life-forms. Likewise, we propose that the findings in Figure 1 universal tendency in natural language to classify emotion categories by means of binary opposition, apparently by using the quality of the emotions as the criterion for making the distinction, with the valence of one anchor frequently being positive and the opposing anchor being negative. In an effort to show that the principle of binary opposition does indeed apply to the classification of emotion categories, we suggest antonymic pairings that run counter to prevailing beliefs in the English language because, in contrast to the conventional binary oppositions of emotion terms in English, we based our hypothesized pairings on the generalized encoding sequence of the world's languages shown in Figure 1 . Future research will need to establish whether the proposed pairings have merit. The concept of binary opposition is not new to the study of emotions. More than two decades ago, Solomon and Corbit (1974) proposed that the arousal of an emotion is followed at its termination by the arousal of an opponent-process emotion. In their model, however, the particular combination of emotion opponents is unstable and changes with repetition of the arousing stimulus. The concept of binary opposition also is present in circumplex models of affect (Fromme & O'Brien, 1982; Plutchik, 1980; Russell, 1980) and in the semantic differential research of Osgood et al. (1975) . Keeping in mind that the emotion terms in Figure 1 refer to emotion categories (see Appendix B), we submit that Stages 1 and 2 illustrate the tendency toward antonymic encoding. Emotions of disapprobation (i.e., anger-hate-spite) are classified in opposition to emotions of contrition (i.e., guilt-shame-regret). Such an antonymic relation appears to be credible. In most studies of anger-inducing events, Averill (1982) found the cause of anger to be attributed to voluntary and unjustified acts by another person. He concluded that anger is an attribution of blame. Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) argued that feelings of guilt are commonly engendered by violation of interpersonal and social standards.
The amusement-joy-satisfaction category in Stage 2 apparently is in opposition to the depression-despair-misery category, a bipolarity that is also a component of Plutchik's (1980) multidimensional model of emotions. Because the remaining categories in Stage 2 appear not to be logical opposites to the categories in Stage 3, by default then, we suggest that the emotions of approach (i.e., adoration-love-attraction) are opposed by the emotions of avoidance or withdrawal (i.e., alarm-fear-shock).
In Stages 3 and 4, alienation-neglect-defeat appears to oppose eagerness-hope-optimism, and the pleasant emotions of arousaldesire-passion are in opposition to the emotions of pain, agonysuffering-hurt. In Stages 5 and 6, contentment-pleasure is opposed by aggravation-annoyance-irritation, and anxiety-worrydistress opposes pride-triumph. In Stages 7 and 8, we found two anomalies. First, the amazement-surprise-astonishment category had no binary opposite in Shaver et al.'s (1987) categories, although opposing terms such as boredom, anticipation, expectation, presentiment, foreboding, and intuition are available in natural language.
1 Second, we suggest that a ternary classification may be present in the opposition of pity-sympathy to disgust-contemptrevulsion and to envy-jealousy. That is, in opposition to emotions of empathy and the offer of succor are negative attitudes toward others as expressed in the emotions of loathing, covetous embitterment, and the suspicion of losing something of value to others. The category of enthusiasm-excitement-zeal opposes dismay-disappointment-displeasure.
In Stage 9, the exasperation-frustration category opposes the enthrallment-fascination-rapture category. We propose that relief may form another ternary classification by opposing longing and torment.
Marked and unmarked emotion categories. In addition to the hypothesis of a human tendency to classify emotion categories by means of binary opposition in natural language, we found that the emotion category listed first in each pair of counterparts had at least one term (perhaps the focal emotion of the category) that occurred more frequently in English prose (using the count found in Francis & Kucera, 1982) than any term in the opposing category (see the frequency counts in Appendix B). That is, at least one word in the emotion category of, say, anger occurs more frequently in English prose (i.e., hate = 66) than any term in the opposing category of guilt (i.e., guilt = 33). What accounts for the consistency of this finding across all hypothesized category pairs? An explanation may be available with markedness theory.
Text frequency, a concept of markedness theory (Greenberg, 1966 (Greenberg, , 1975 (Greenberg, , 1987 , is a characteristic of unmarked and marked categories. The latter phenomenon was first noted by Trubetzkoi (1939) and developed extensively by Greenberg (1966 Greenberg ( , 1975 Greenberg ( , 1987 . Greenberg (1966) presented evidence strongly suggesting that the concept of marking applies to the phonological, grammatical, and lexical aspects of all languages. We limit ourselves to antonyms (i.e., lexical characteristics) to illustrate markedness theory because they come closest to our speculation that the naming of folk emotion categories proceeded universally in binary opposition. Greenberg (1966) noted that "for long/short, wide/narrow, deep/ shallow . . ., the first member is unmarked and the second marked" (p. 52). Typically, the unmarked term occurs more frequently in language usage and, hence, is more salient than its marked counterpart. For example, people tend to frame questions with the unmarked form, as in, "How long is the stick?" rather than "How short is the stick?" Similarly, people ask, "How deep is the lake?" rather than "How shallow is the lake?"
We are suggesting that the first member of the emotion binary opposites always has at least one term with higher prose frequency than the opposing member because, in the framework of markedness theory, the first member is unmarked (i.e., more salient to children and adults alike) and the second is marked. That is, queries, confessions, opinions, and assertions involving emotions more often are framed with unmarked forms, for example, angerhate-spite, than marked forms, such as guilt-shame-regret. For example; we hypothesize that statements of dislike (e.g., "I hate that," "This pisses me off," or "I could kill him/her") are more common than admissions of wrongdoing (e.g., "I am ashamed," "I feel guilty," or "I made a mistake").
An additional implication of markedness theory is that "if a language has the marked value, it always has the unmarked, but not necessarily vice versa" (Greenberg, 1987, p. 368) . A supportive example for the Stage 1 categories in Figure 1 (and an example that not all languages strictly adhere to the developmental sequence proposed in Figure 1 ) is found in the Zuni language, which has encoded the unmarked term of anger but not the marked term of guilt (S. Newman, 1958) .
Given that aspects of markedness theory have been shown to be present universally in natural language (Greenberg, 1966 (Greenberg, , 1987 , it seems likely that text frequency for emotion categories also may be a universal phenomenon. Unfortunately, information is not currently available to determine whether the difference in word frequency in English also may hold for the remaining languages in our sample. Moreover, because of our particular procedure for locating emotion terms in foreign languages that may be equivalent lexically to the English terms, it is unlikely that the foreign terms in Appendix C also are coincidentally the terms with the highest frequency in their respective native languages. Therefore, our hypothesis is, at best, speculative.
We speculate further regarding an additional potential implication of antonymic encoding. A characteristic of markedness theory, labeled facultative expression, is that the unmarked term is more general than the marked term. As an example, "note the use of the unmarked 'author' ... to refer to a writer regardless of sex, while 'authoress' indicates only a female writer" (Greenberg, 1966, p. 51) .
We propose that facultative expression also may extend to the categories of folk emotion terms. Thus, of the pairs of binary opposites listed above, we hypothesized that the first member of each pair not only would be unmarked but also would be more general. For example, we hypothesized that anger-hate-spite would have wider application in natural language than would guilt-shame-regret, at least in English. Likewise, adoration-loveattraction would be less specific than alarm-fear-shock, and so on.
To obtain a preliminary test of the hypothesis for English emotion terms, 71 students in an upper-division class on emotion (mode age = 23 years) read Greenberg's (1966) distinction between author and authoress at the top of a sheet of paper, followed by the 13 pairs of binary opposites, and the request to indicate which opposites in each pair were more general. In view of Tversky's (1977) finding that participants in similarity judgment tasks tended to place greater weight on the first member of a comparison, for approximately half of the students the position of the antonymic pairings was reversed. Also, the order of appearance of each binary pair in the sequence of 13 pairs was varied.
The hypothesis was supported. The students perceived the first member of each pair of the binary opposites listed above as more general for 12 of the 13 pairs (sign-test p < .002). The exception was envy-jealousy, which the students perceived to be more general (n = 44) than pity-sympathy (n = 27). In sum, the first member of each pair of binary opposites not only is unmarked but also is more frequently used in English prose and is perceived to be more general than the second member of each pair.
Declining morphologic complexity of emotion terms over time. Sapir (1912 Sapir ( /1958 hypothesized that the morphologic development of a vocabulary tends to decrease from the earliest recorded forms to the present. 2 When applied to emotion terms, the hypothesis implies, as does markedness theory, that the grammatical structure of the most frequently used words in the emotion categories of Stages 1 and 2 in Figure 1 is less elaborate than the high-frequency terms in Stages 8 and 9. The underlying assumption is that the Stages 1 and 2 terms were encoded much earlier and therefore had lost their morphologic complexity in comparison with more recently encoded Stages 8 and 9 terms.
Consistent with the hypothesis is the demonstration of Zipf (1935 Zipf ( , 1949 that the frequency of use of lexical items correlates with their phonological length. High-frequency items, in comparison with low-frequency items, are shorter and, hence, less complex. As lexical items increase in frequency of use (e.g., television), they tend to be shortened (i.e., TV) and presumably are learned earlier by children.
To test Sapir's (1912 Sapir's ( /1958 ) hypothesis, we used the terms with the highest frequency count (see Appendix B or the caption to Figure 1 ) in each emotion category of Stages 1, 2, 8, and 9. We substituted one emotion term. Instead of using sadness, with a frequency count of only 6, we substituted the grammatical variant of sad (frequency = 35). That removed depression (frequency = 27), a morphologically complex term, from holding the highest frequency count in its emotion category. The justification for the substitution was that sad is an older term than depression. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) , sad initially meant satiated and satisfied. Circa 1366 A.D., it acquired its modern meaning of sorrow. Not until 300 years later (circa 1665) did depression take on its modern meaning.
With that substitution, all of the highest frequency Stages 1 and 2 terms were morphologically and phonologically simpler (i.e., hate, guilt, love, fear, joy, and sad) than the Stages 8 and 9 terms (i.e., excitement, disappointment, sympathy, frustration, and fascination). In support of Sapir's (1912 Sapir's ( /1958 hypothesis, the difference in the mean rank frequencies of the two sets of categories (Ms = 8.17 and 3.40, respectively) was statistically significant, Mann-Whitney U = 2.00, p < .02 (two-tailed).
Expansion of the emotion categories. Markedness theory may provide a plausible account for some features of the naming of folk emotion categories, but it cannot illuminate the motive that spawned the particular encoding sequence in Figure 1 . That is, markedness theory cannot explain the motivation for naming the categories in Stage 1 before those in Stage 2, and so on. Whereas there is evidence to suggest that the lexical encoding sequence for the basic color terms of black, white, red, yellow, green, and blue may have a neurophysiological basis (for a review, see Bornstein, 1975) , no similar process is currently known that could account for the implicational relationships of the naming of folk emotion terms. In other words, although the gene pool and the neuroanatomical substrates provide the physiological component of human emotions in an as yet unknown manner, it is unlikely that they governed the emotion encoding sequence.
We propose that the emotion categories of Stages 5-9 are derivatives of the antonymic pairs of Stages 1-4. Witkowski and Brown (1977) suggested that the encoding of derivatives operates in the naming of colors (e.g., gray is a derivative of the blackwhite antonymic pair). We believe that the same process applies in the encoding of emotions. That is, an opposition initially is perceived on a particular dimension, such as the quality of the emotion categories. Then the poles are labeled, and later possibly a middle emotion category is differentiated, usually on a different dimension than the original binary opposition, such as an intensity dimension, or the more general emotional theme of the parent category, say anger-hate-spite, is differentiated into emotion categories that identify specific instances of the parent emotional theme, as may be the case of disgust and envy being specific types of dislikes or hate.
To paraphrase a caution articulated by Frijda, Markam, Sato, and Wiers (1995) , the concept of derivative emotion categories does not necessarily imply that they are variants or mixtures (Arnold, 1960; McDougall, 1926; Plutchik, 1980) of the categories encoded in earlier stages. The derivatives may well be categories in their own right and most likely evolved because the parent antonymic pair was insufficient to express newly recognized emotional themes, variations in emotional intensity, or newly evolved intra-and interpersonal relationships. It is (he shortcoming of the parent category that is the likely motivation for the spawning of new categories.
Apropos to our position that the derivatives may be separate emotions is the issue of what, in that case, motivated the similarity ratings by Shaver et al. (1987) . Consider the terms in the alarm category (Appendix B). Terms such as fear, horror, terror, and panic may have in common the feeling of intense helplessness but not necessarily semantic synonymity. The experience of horror when observing a loved one being repeatedly run over by a fast-moving stream of cars on a freeway is unlikely to simultaneously elicit fear, an emotion generally aroused when personal well-being is threatened. That is, the two emotions are separate constructs. Similarly, regarding the anger category with its purported synonym of hate, Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) viewed hate as an example of an affective and aesthetic reaction to objects (i.e., an intense dislike of objects), whereas they characterized anger as arising when individuals simultaneously focus on the action of someone and the resulting event with its consequences. Their distinction again suggests that the synonymity rating of the two emotions may not have been based on semantic synonymity and, for that matter, also not on co-occurrence of the emotions in daily life, as Schimmack and Reisenzein (1997) proposed, in view of Averill's (1982) finding that anger is more likely to be directed at loved ones than hated individuals. Anger and hate are not interchangeable terms or emotions; they differ in their application. Thus, if terms within an emotion category can differ, then newly spawned emotion categories also can differ from the so-called parent antonymic pair without the assumption that they are variants or mixtures of them.
An instance of a middle emotion category being recognized and labeled is available in Stage 1. The bipolar pair of anger-hatespite and guilt-shame-regret brings forth on the anger pole an intermediate intensity emotion category of aggravationannoyance-irritation in Stage 5. Later still in Stage 9, a further differentiation is recognized by the propagation of the categories of exasperation-frustration and torment.
But the anger pole was not the sole generator of new emotions. The adjoining hate-spite pole, with its companion emotions of dislike, resentment, and vengefulness in Shaver et al.'s (1987) category, spawned the disgust-contempt-revulsion and envyjealousy categories of Stage 7, perhaps to facilitate communication about particular dislikes, such as disgusting taste experiences and reproaches (e.g., other individuals enjoying undue favors or interlopers threatening one's love relationship). That is, the new emotions are different types of dislikes rather than variations in intensity along the hate-spite dimension. Because of their more recent encoding, markedness theory predicts that the derived emotion categories are marked (i.e., less salient) in relation to the parent antonymic pair.
In the adoration-love-attraction and alarm-fear-shock pair of Stage 2, the former pole, in addition to the affection theme, contains terms of succorance, such as compassion, caring, and tenderness. We suggest that the need to communicate about different types of caring, for example, the preventive care of mothers for their infants or the desire to alleviate the plight of people who are terminally ill, generated the pity-sympathy category of Stage 8. The alarm-fear-shock pole, in antonymic relation with adoration-love-attraction, spawned the less intense anxietyworry-distress category along an intensity dimension.
The amusement-joy-satisfaction and depression-despairmisery opponent pair differentiated four new emotion categories: three along an intensity dimension and one as a qualitative distinction. Thus, the contentment-pleasure (i.e., Stage 6) and enthrallment-rapture categories (i.e., Stage 9), both variations in intensity, became differentiated from the amusement-joysatisfaction pole. This pole also spawned the pride-triumph category (i.e., Stage 5), which as a qualitative differentiation represents joy and satisfaction in a particular situation. The depressiondespair-misery pole produced a less intense version of itself with the dismay-disappointment-displeasure category (i.e., Stage 8) .
In the alienation-neglect-defeat and eagemess-hope-optimism antonymic pair, we propose that the latter pole generated the enthusiasm-excitement-zeal category of Stage 8, possibly to encode the consequence of experiencing the emotional theme of the parent pole. We propose that the arousal-desire-passion and agony-suffering-hurt antonymic pair differentiated into the longing category (i.e., Stage 9) on the former pole, perhaps to facilitate communication about a painful type of desire and passion. The agony pole appears to have given rise to the relief category (i.e., Stage 9) as an antonymic pole.
From our perspective, the distinguishing feature of the Stages 5-9 emotion categories is that they all have antecedent parent emotion categories in Stages 1-4 that provided the springboard for further differentiation. The earlier encoded stages served as the perimeter for the derivations of the later emotion labels. The exception is the amazement-surprise-astonishment category of Stage 7, a category that is just as easily communicated by exclamations as by words. It has no parent category in Stages 1-4; therefore, we classified it as being a parent category itself and viewed it as being part of the Stages 1-4 emotion categories for the purpose of our next proposal. 3 With that alteration, the 11 categories of Stages 1-4 may be viewed as the universal basic emotion categories in natural language from which additional emotion categories ostensibly became differentiated in later stages of encoding. By "basic emotion categories," we mean only that the 11 categories, or more accurately the experiences they label, are of such importance in human interactions that they were among the first to be named across cultures. It is a linguistic basic emotions hypothesis to contrast it with the thesis that all emotions are blends of a limited set of basic emotions (Arnold, 1960; McDougall, 1926; Plutchik, 1980) or are lower level classifications of higher order basic emotions in a hierarchical model of semantic categorization (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Shaver et al., 1987) . 3 Nico H. Frijda, in his capacity as a reviewer, noted that our speculations regarding the basis for the classification of emotion categories by means of binary opposition and the basis for the expansion of Stages 5-9 could just as well, and perhaps more interestingly, have been based on the concept of emotional action readiness (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) . We agree that such an alternative analysis may well prove fruitful. However, if our hypothesis that similar principles govern the classification of colors, emotions, and botanical terms is ultimately shown to be useful and best represents human classification tendencies, then its scope of applicability will be more general than that of the concept of emotional action readiness.
They are the core emotions that laypeople cross-culturally want to talk about but a number of which, such as the adoration category and the categories of Stages 3-4, are not part of the lists of basic emotions compiled by English-speaking researchers (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1982; Izard, 1971; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Plutchik, 1980 ). Arnold's list is similar to ours by covering 7 of our categories. She did not include terms for the categories of agony, amazement, amusement, and guilt. There is, of course, no requirement for the folk theory of basic emotions to resemble the theories of researchers (Fletcher, 1995) . What laypeople universally consider as basic emotions is an important topic of study in its own right.
The emotions missing in the lists of various researchers (e.g., anguish, loneliness, desire, suffering, hope) are what Markus and Kitayama (1991) designated as "ego-focused emotions." Individuals' needs, goals, and desires are their primary referents in contrast to the emotions of Stages 1-2, which frequently are triggered by considerations external to individuals. Their relatively early encoding points to their significance to laypeople. And, indeed, individuals lacking hope, desire, love, and so on would be severely curbed in human affairs.
Our cross-cultural folk taxonomy of emotion words also differs considerably from the taxonomies for English proposed by other researchers (e.g., Clore, Ortony, & Foss, 1987; de Rivera, 1977; de Rivera & Grinkis, 1986; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony et al., 1988; Plutchik, 1980; Scherer, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987; Storm & Storm, 1987; Thamm, 1992) . This difference is to be expected, given that we are studying folk taxonomies and our goal was to determine the developmental sequence of the emotion lexicon of the world's languages rather than of only English. Although we have proffered the suggestion that Stages 5-9 are derivatives of the earlier stages, the question still remains regarding what prompted the particular sequential development of Stages 1-4.
Sequence of Emotion Categories
Social control. That the anger and guilt categories were encoded first suggests that the need to maintain social control may have been a priority in all societies. The attribution of blame appears to be a fundamental component of anger across cultures (Frijda et al., 1995) . The sumptuary laws of Western European societies 500 years ago are only one example of how communities seek to regulate behavior. They informed citizens of what to wear and eat and how to conduct the routine of daily life without violating public decency. Violation of standards tends to elicit the types of emotions listed in Shaver et al.'s (1987) anger and guilt categories.
If social control had been the sole motivation for the initial encoding of emotion words, then we would have expected additional encoding of the categories of alienation (i.e., humiliation, embarrassment, rejection) and envy-jealousy. Instead, they were not encoded until Stages 3 and 7, respectively, suggesting the influence of other motives.
Labeling of facial expressions of emotions. Some researchers have taken the position that affective facial expressions have biological roots (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980) , which should be mirrored in the linguistic code. How the mirroring is to manifest itself is not made clear. We explore two possibilities. One plausible reason for encoding emotions may have been to identify common facial expressions of emotions (cf. Fridlund, 1997) . Indeed, the majority of the emotion categories in Stage 2 include terms for identification of facial affective expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1971) , such us fear (alarm category), happiness (amusement category), and sadness (depression category). When they are combined with the anger category of Stage 1, then only disgust and surprise are missing from the group of emotions believed to be expressed universally on the face (cf. Russell, 1994) . Disgust and surprise were not encoded until Stage 7, possibly because of the ease of communicating those emotions and conversing about them with exclamations, such as the Zuni's use of we for disgust and of ati for surprise and shame (S. Newman, 1958) .
The hypothesis that the labeling of facial affective expressions may have driven the encoding process, not only in Stage 2 but also in Stage 1, is strengthened when we include Izard's (1977) proposal that shame, a term in the guilt category, is as much a facially expressed emotion as anger, disgust, fear, and so on. With that addition, five of the six categories in Stages 1-2 are accounted for by the facial hypothesis. Only the adoration category remains. It is not listed by researchers as a facially recognizable emotion category, most likely because of limitations in the current methodology for identifying facial emotions. Judging by the facial expressions and behavior of infants, they appear to feel an emotion that is variously described as affection, caring, fondness, liking, or nonsexual love. Such an emotional theme may be difficult to identify with the widespread use of still photographs in research on the facial expressions of emotions. Perhaps the distinguishing cue for affection is gazing (Kellerman, Lewis, & Laird, 1989; Rubin, 1970) , a duration variable that is difficult to capture on photographs but that is probably applicable to other emotions, such as horror, which may well be a fear expression held for an extended period.
A second possibility for the biological roots of affective facial expressions to be mirrored in the linguistic code is that the encoding process emulated the ontogeny of facial emotional expressions in newborns. According to Lewis's (1993) Prototype model. The prototype model of Shaver et al. (1987) comes closest to matching the universal emotion encoding sequence for Stages 1-2 but not Stages 3-4. According to Shaver et al.'s prototype model, one would expect anger (anger), fear (alarm), joy (amusement), love (adoration), sadness (depression), and surprise (amazement) to be labeled first because of their status as basic-level emotions in the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis. And indeed they are in Stages 1 and 2, with the exception of the amazement category, which is not encoded until Stage 7, and the presence of the guilt category in natural language but not a basic-level emotion in the prototype model.
In sum, in response to the question of what may have motivated the encoding sequence in natural language, the emerging picture suggests that the initial impetus may have been to encode terms for two major social control categories, then terms for prototypical emotions commonly elicited in interpersonal relationships, followed by terms descriptive of intrapersonal emotions. Alternatively, our hypotheses regarding the motivation for the initial encoding stages (i.e., social control, labeling of facial expressions, and encoding of prototype emotions) may not be mutually exclusive. 4 If the so-called basic emotions have a genetic foundation, it seems likely that they would pertain to the fundamental social situations in which human beings find themselves. Equally likely is that the expression of the emotions, whether in the face, in the voice, or through instrumental responses, influenced others. Given such fundamental emotion-eliciting situations, they and the emotions commonly associated with them must have been prime candidates for encoding and the formation of prototypes. Thus, rather than affecting the encoding process sequentially, the labeling of facial expressions, social control categories, and prototypical emotions may have been simultaneous.
General Discussion
We found that the naming of emotion categories was relatively uniform across languages when English terms were used as the referents and when the establishment of the universal developmental sequence of the emotion lexicon was based on emotion category terms that all sampled languages had encoded. We also found that the encoding process may have been driven by the need to label emotions elicited in conflicts, by emotions aroused in dayto-day interpersonal relations, and by emotions that both enrich and torment personal inner life. We proposed that the principle of binary opposition may guide the universal folk classification of emotions, possibly corroborating previous research showing crosscultural similarities in antonymic judgments (Raybeck & Herrmann, 1990 . First, polar extremes are labeled, such as anger and guilt, and then derivative emotion categories fill in and subdivide the range either on an intensity dimension or by the recognition of more precisely differentiated emotional themes than are available with the polar opposites.
An additional finding, which is limited to English emotion categories until it can be corroborated across languages, was support for features of markedness theory (Greenberg, 1966 (Greenberg, , 1975 (Greenberg, , 1987 . That is, for all antonymic emotion categories, one of the pairs always had at least one term that was used more frequently in English prose than any term in the opposing category. In markedness theory, the more frequently used term is rendered unmarked, is presumably acquired earlier by children, and is more salient to adults than is the less frequently used marked term. It also is encoded first, is more general in application, and is morphologically simpler than the marked term.
The list of basic emotion categories in the cross-cultural folk lexicon, we found, is longer than those proposed by Englishspeaking researchers (Arnold, 1960; Ekman et al., 1982; Izard, 1971; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, . 1987; Plutchik, 1980) . Researchers usually compiled their lists on the basis of the assumption that the emotions are an integral part of the human neuro-anatomic-physiological system. In contrast, laypeople worldwide appear to have used the criterion of relevance of the emotion to recurring human interactions. The encoded emotions are the ones most frequently used in conversations.
One third of our sample of languages had terms for all 25 of Shaver et al.'s (1987) emotion categories. Of the remaining languages, all had terms for at least 15 of the categories. These findings, in addition to the cross-culturally uniform sequence of labeling emotion categories, strongly suggest that the lexical regularity, if not based on social and phenomenological experiences common to the human species, surely is founded on innate principles of human language. Our findings are consistent with increasing reports of cross-cultural similarities in the emotion domain (Buunk & Hupka, 1987; Church, Katigbak, Reyes, & Jensen, 1998; Frijda et al., 1995; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; Herrmann & Raybeck, 1981; Hupka et al., 1985 Hupka et al., , 1993 Hupka & Zaleski, 1990; Hupka, Zaleski, Otto, Reidl, & Tarabrina, 1996 Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Osgood et al., 1975; Rorrmey et al., 1997; Russell, 1983 Russell, , 1991 Russell, Lewicka, & Niit, 1989; Scherer, 1988 Scherer, , 1997 Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986; Shaver et al., 1992) .
Because our findings are consistent with prior studies of folk terminology in different domains, such as the labeling of colors (Berlin & Kay, 1969) and botanical life-forms (C. H. Brown, 1977) , we agree with Witkowski and Brown (1977) that the encoding process in folk terminology is governed by language universals. The guiding hand of one such principle is the labeling of emotions by the process of binary opposition. Markedness theory identifies additional cross-cultural language regularities (Greenberg, 1966 (Greenberg, , 1975 (Greenberg, , 1987 . Such principles facilitate division of the'broad range of potential emotional responses into a relatively small number of emotion categories that human beings feel a need to talk about.
This interpretation of our findings raises the issue of what the relationship is between the language of emotions and the physiology of emotions. For example, linguistically, folk terminology distinguishes between, say, the adoration category (i.e., love, attraction, affection) and the amusement category (i.e., joy, satisfaction, delight), but such a distinction has not been shown to be present at the somatovisceral level. Even if such distinctions can be demonstrated someday, whether at the somatovisceral, hormonal, neural, or neurochemical level, the issue is that human beings are not accurate in detecting specific autonomic responses within their bodies (e.g., Pennebaker, Gonder-Frederick, Stewart, Elfman, & Skelton, 1982; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980) , and on the basis of the findings with individuals with spinal cord injuries, awareness of autonomic arousal appears not even to be necessary for emotional experience (Chwalisz, Diener, & Gallagher, 1988) . When these findings are viewed in the context of Averill's (1974) observation that the link between emotion and bodily change in Western philosophy and psychology is more a matter of psychophysiological symbolism than of science as well as the finding that individuals in different cultures frequently disagree as to where particular emotions are felt in the body (Hupka et al., 1996) , they strongly point to the possibility that folk emotion language is governed by different principles than those regulating the neuro-anatomic-physiological processes of emotions. But how can distinctions be made linguistically among the hundreds of emotion terms when the distinctions apparently are not matched at the physiological level?
An intriguing model by Cacioppo, Berntson, and Klein (1992) accounts for the phenomenon that identical somatovisceral attributes nevertheless may elicit different emotional labels from individuals as different emotional schemas are serially activated. They liken their model to the experience of viewing ambiguous figures, where one moment, say, the face of an old woman is recognized, and the next moment, with the identical stimulus input, the face of a young woman is seen. Analogous to the splitting of white light into different primary colors with a prism, perhaps general positive and negative feelings may be differentiable linguistically into different emotions by environmental and cognitive processes. Of significance to this topic is that the emphasis of Cacioppo et al. on cognitive operations as the determinants of different emotion labels for identical somatovisceral sensations is consistent not only with our observation of the loose connection between the language of emotion categories and the physiology of emotion but also with the finding that the encoding of folk emotion categories is influenced by linguistic principles (cf. Russell, 1980) . This was an exploratory study into the possibility of a human universal bearing on the naming of similar emotion categories across cultures and the possibility that the naming of the categories progressed in a relatively similar fashion. Future research will have to determine how accurate our initial attempt has been. Our suggestive findings touch on several issues discussed by Russell (1991) . Do different cultures carve up the domain of emotion differently? On the basis of our findings and those of other researchers (Church et al., 1998; Romney et al., 1997) , many languages not only have general emotion categories similar to those in English but also have as many categories. Perhaps some have even more or different ones, but we did not explore that possibility. Do the similarities in emotion categories across languages support Darwin's (1872 Darwin's ( /1965 hypothesis that the expression and recognition of emotions are part of the human biological heritage, and do they support the proposal by Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) that basic emotions (i.e., anger, fear, disgust, happiness, and sadness) are innately determined, undefinable semantic primitives? Our findings are consistent with those hypotheses; however, a conservative interpretation takes note that the findings do not address the hypotheses. The presence of lexical emotion categories in foreign language dictionaries does not reveal whether they are applied similarly across languages. As we have mentioned already, the emotion category terms of torment and relief appear to have different applications in various languages. Perhaps the most one can say is that the presence of similar emotion categories in many languages and the apparent cross-culturally uniform development of the emotion lexicon are compatible with the notion that human beings come into the world equipped with a fundamental emotion grammar structure that propels them to emotionalize intra-and interpersonal goals and situations and to respond to them emotionally in body and in language with far more similarity across languages than the emphasis on cross-cultural differences might lead one to expect. What is universal is not only the ability to be emotional in the cultural settings of one's society but also, according to our findings, to a large extent the perception of which emotion-arousing situations are worth encoding.
Much in this study invites additional exploration to further understanding of linguistic universals in the language of emotion. For example, are the antonymic emotion categories across languages also characterized by unmarked and marked categories as they appear to be in English? Are unmarked emotion categories more salient to children and adults across languages? Are emotion statements typically more likely to be phrased in unmarked than marked emotion terms? To what degree and under what conditions do native speakers of languages agree with the antonymic emotion pairs that are based on the generalized encoding sequence of the world's languages? Which model, the cross-cultural folk model of linguistic basic emotions or the models of basic emotions of English-speaking researchers, more accurately captures the core emotions in daily human interactions? Is there a relationship between the universal linguistic antonymic pairs of this study and Solomon and Corbit's (1974) proposal that the somatic arousal of a particular emotion is followed by the arousal of an opponent emotion? Answers to such questions may advance knowledge of the panhuman categorization of emotions in natural language, which, in turn, may facilitate understanding of how folk models differ from scientific models of emotions.
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